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Federalists tried to shore up their position in the short time before Adams left office. Just a few weeks before Jefferson's inauguration, the outgoing Federalist Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, creating sixteen new federal circuit judgeships. 3 In a separate act, Congress created three additional circuit judgeships and over forty justices of the peace for the District of Columbia.' Adams hastily filled as many of these positions as he could with his supporters. As a Federalist senator famously observed to a friend, his party was "about to experience a heavy gale of adverse wind; can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship thro the storm?" 5 In short order, however, President Jefferson and the Republicans regained the initiative. Shrugging off the Federalists' protests, the new Congress repealed the Judiciary Act, abolished the new courts, and put the so-called "midnight judges" out of their jobs. ' Jefferson also ordered his Secretary of State to ignore some signed commissions that the Adams administration had forgotten to deliver to justices of the peace during the chaotic changeover, leading William Marbury and several other would-be JPs to sue to get hold of their commissions. Marbury lost, but in deciding his case Chief Justice John Marshall promulgated what has become the classic statement of judicial review, the proposition that courts have the power to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress. ' The midnight judges, by contrast, never even came before the Court. In the standard account, they managed only a meek protest before giving up the fight:
Certain of the deposed National judges had, indeed, taken steps to bring the . .. measure before the Supreme Court, but their energies flagged, their hearts failed, and their only action was a futile and foolish protest to the very Congress that had wrested their judicial seats from under them. 8 Beyond these cursory facts, the judges largely faded from historical memory.
In 1961, Kathryn Turner first treated the midnight judges as an object of study in their own right, giving a superb exposition of the harried process that led to their appointments. 9 However, despite an outpouring of work on Jefferson, Marshall, and the federal judiciary in the fifty years since Turner's piece, not enough attention has been paid to the second-and in many ways more intriguing-half of the judges' story: their response to the abolition of their offices. Most scholarship mentions only in passing that the judges sent a written memorial to Congress (the protest referred to above).'o And while some have treated the subject in relatively more detail," or remarked upon the actions of individual judges,' 2 there is as yet no comprehensive treatment of what the midnight judges did following the repeal and why. Despite its casual notoriety, in other words, there is still a need for "some further information" about this major constitutional episode. This Note draws on a variety of primary sources, including an overlooked cache of the judges' letters held at the Maryland Historical Society, to sketch out the midnight judges' deliberations in full. Its primary goal is to show that the midnight judges were not just a "futile and foolish" stop on the road to Marbury. To the contrary, the judges thoughtfully and conscientiously sought to challenge the constitutionality of the repeal of the Judiciary Act, even if their efforts did not culminate in the restoration of their offices. The picture that emerges from these sources does more than just recast the role of the midnight judges, however. It also offers new insights into the ways in which Federalists in all branches of government both resisted and capitulated to the emerging political order ushered in by the election of 1800. Ultimately, this new account argues for a revised understanding that puts the midnight judges, if not on the marquee, at least in a supporting role in working out the meaning of the repeal.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I outlines the constitutional controversy over the repeal of the Judiciary Act. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's response, culminating with Marbury v. Madison and the lesser-known Stuart v. Laird, important decisions that nonetheless left the central question of the repeal unanswered. Part III briefly corrects a persistent historical error that continues to confound attempts to figure out why this might be the case. Part IV describes the midnight judges' early efforts to bring their case to judicial resolution, efforts that intersected in notable ways with the parallel deliberations occurring at the Supreme Court. Part V describes how, with the judicial avenue blocked, the judges ultimately turned to Congress in a last-ditch attempt to salvage their claims. Finally, Part VI concludes by examining the aftermath of the midnight judges' efforts.
I.
The Federalists contemplated changes to the federal courts well before their defeat in the election of 1800.14 Although the Judiciary Act of 1801 was undoubtedly enacted for crassly political reasons, it also addressed several legitimate criticisms of the original Judiciary Act of 1789. For example, the 1789 Act did not create any independent circuit courts. Instead, the Supreme Court justices periodically left Washington, D.C. to "ride circuit" and presided over circuit courts themselves. The justices had detested circuit riding almost from the start, in part for its physical discomforts,' 5 and in part because they harbored doubts about its constitutionality.' 6 The 1801 Act created permanent circuit courts staffed with full-time judges, relieving the Supreme Court of the need to ride circuit. The Act also made important changes to the scope of federal authority. In response to worries about the partiality of state courts, for instance, it granted general federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts for the first time.' 7 The result was a federal judiciary that was larger and more pervasive than ever before.' These changes were anathema to many Republicans, certainly, but they hated the partisan aspects of the Judiciary Act even more. Not only did the Federalists force through a controversial expansion of the federal judiciary after they were repudiated at the polls, but Adams chose to staff the new courts with his own supporters instead of leaving the positions for Jefferson to fill. Republicans found the judicial appointments particularly obnoxious because, unlike executive officials whom Jefferson could (and often did) remove at will," the Constitution appeared to grant federal judges life tenure. And there was a further wrinkle: the 1801 Act reduced the size of the Supreme Court from six to five, with the change taking place at the next vacancy.
2 0 In other words, Jefferson would not be able to make an appointment to the Court until two justices died or retired.
Still, Adams had to move quickly once the Act was passed, since Jefferson would take office in March 1801. Although his administration was largely successful in packing the new courts, they did make some embarrassing blunders. Some nominees unexpectedly turned down judgeships, setting off a scramble to find replacements; several appointees, including two senators who resigned from Congress, accidentally received worthless commissions to offices that were either occupied or did not exist. 2 On January 6, 1802, Senator John Breckinridge proposed the repeal of the Judiciary Act. 34 The debates over repeal occupied hundreds of pages in the Congressional journals." Federalists tried to make a pragmatic case for the expanded federal courts, but the real dispute turned on the constitutional question of whether Congress could abolish the office of a sitting judge. Both sides could point to relevant text in Article III. On the one hand, by vesting " [t] he Judicial Power of the United States .. . in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," the Constitution granted Congress broad authority to tinker with the structure of the lower federal courts. 36 On the other, Article III guaranteed federal judges tenure "during good behaviour" and an undiminished salary "during their continuance in office," suggesting that Congress did not have plenary authority to dismiss sitting judges. 37 Although Republicans admitted that they could not interfere with a judge's tenure and salary while his office existed, they argued that Congress could abolish the office itself, particularly because they perceived the new circuit courts as expensive, unnecessary, and inimical 3 1. Letter from James Jackson to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1801 to the popular will. 38 The Federalists replied that that distinction between office and officeholder was entirely specious. 39 Some called for the courts to exercise judicial review and strike down the repeal as unconstitutional.
40 They further denied that the latest election represented anything but the whim of a transient majority, and warned of dire consequences if Congress cast aside the Constitution's safeguards.
In theory, a few defectors in the Senate could swing the vote to the Federalists, but as the debates stretched into a second month, it became apparent that the Republicans would not budge. Senator James Hillhouse confided to his friend, the midnight judge Oliver Wolcott, that "[t]he most impressive eloquence will not change a single vote."
4 ' The Repeal Act narrowly passed the Senate on February 13. On March 3, it passed the House of Representatives, where the Republicans enjoyed a greater majority, by a much more comfortable margin. President Jefferson signed the bill into law five days later. 42 An editorial in the Washington Federalist typified, that party's sentiments, lamenting, "The fatal Bill has passed: Our Constitution is no more." Some Federalists now contemplated independent efforts to challenge the repeal," but for the most part they decided to see how the Supreme Court would react. The Court was scheduled to convene in June, a month before the repeal went into effect. 45 In April, however, Republicans canceled the June term. 46 This change meant that the Court would not formally meet until February 1803, almost a year away. In the meantime, the justices would be expected to ride circuit under the original Judiciary Act of 1789, which had been resurrected upon the repeal of the 1801 Act. Republicans claimed they canceled the June term because the Court did not have enough business to require two sessions a year, but this fooled few observers-least of all the justices. 47 Riding circuit would amount to a tacit acceptance of the repeal's validity, so the change forced the justices to decide on a course of action without consulting face-to-face.
Chief Justice Marshall watched these developments closely. Not only was he the head of the federal judiciary, but he had also helped to draft the Judiciary Act as a member of the House of Representatives in 1800. produced an investigation of the subject" of circuit riding, and he admitted to doubts about the legality of the practice. However, he stressed the importance of unanimity and agreed to abide by the others' opinions on the matter. 52 Scholars have debated whether Marshall was serious about resisting circuit riding at this initial stage.
5 ' This is an interesting issue, to be sure, but for the purposes of this Note, the correspondence is more notable for what was missing entirely: any reference to the midnight judges. The omission is surprising, to put it mildly. As the head of the federal judiciary, Marshall presumably owed something to his brethren, whose Cushing's fatalism suggests that the Court had little appetite for controversy, especially concerning the midnight judges. The fact that the other justices failed to respond at all-at least in the extant correspondence-bolsters this interpretation. By early summer, the clear consensus among the Justices was to ride circuit. Regardless, from Chase's perspective the entire process must have been deeply unsatisfying. The question that had convulsed Congress in early 1802 was not the constitutionality of circuit riding, but the constitutionality of ousting the midnight judges. Yet the justices' correspondence seemed to convey just the opposite. Unhappily, Chase fell into line, "sink[ing]," as he earlier put it, "under the burthen of deciding so momentous a question." 67 As a result of these deliberations, the justices took to the circuits in 1802 and later convened in Washington in February 1803 for their rescheduled term. Two weeks later, Chief Justice Marshall handed down his celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison, acknowledging Marbury's right to his commission before dismissing the case because the statute conferring jurisdiction was unconstitutional.
6 8 In one sense, Marbury gave notice that the Supreme Court would not completely defer to the Republicans, but such ringing proclamations of judicial authority must be measured against the Court's jurisdictional holding, which defused the potential for any real confrontation between the branches.
Indeed, when viewed alongside a lesser-known case called Stuart v. Laird, 69 Marbury looks less like a show of strength and more like another in a string of concessions stretching back to the circuit riding question. Stuart was one of several challenges by Federalist attorneys in circuit courts ranging from Virginia to Massachusetts on the eve of the 1802 elections. Each arose out of cases that had been pending in the circuits at the time of the 1801 Act's repeal and were transferred to the restored courts when the 1801 Act was abolished." All the challenges advanced two distinct claims: (1) the Repeal Act unconstitutionally divested federal judges of tenure, so the transfer was void and the case should be heard in the original court; (2) Supreme Court justices could not constitutionally exercise original jurisdiction under the 1789 circuit-riding model, so the current court could not hear the case. Republicans denounced these legal maneuvers as pure sophistry. A Boston newspaper remarked that the plan "could have originated only in the head of some crack'd brained Lawyer, or some broken down despairing political quack," and characterized it as "the last effort of expiring Federalism in support of their midnight Judiciary."72
In each case, the Federalists ultimately withdrew their objections, save one: Stuart v. Laird, where Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit judge in Virginia, overruled the plea and thus set up an appeal to the Supreme Court. 73 As Bruce Ackerman has shown, Marbury provided an easy roadmap if the Court wished to declare circuit riding unconstitutional. Marbury's core holding was that Congress could not expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction from the enumerated cases in Article III.7 Under that logic, if the Justices exercised such original jurisdiction while riding circuit, and if they did not hold separate commissions as lower federal judges (who could be granted more extensive original jurisdiction), then the practice was clearly unconstitutional. from one court to another and had indisputably done so here; as such, there was no need to reach the question of the constitutionality of abolishing the midnight judges' offices.
7 ' Next, because the Justices "acquiesced" in riding circuit under the original Judiciary Act for ten years, Paterson concluded the Court was bound by precedent-"the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.""
III.
Stuart was hardly the ideal vehicle to challenge the repeal of the Judiciary Act. 79 As Justice Patterson noted, whether Congress could transfer cases between courts and whether Congress could abolish the office of a sitting judge were two separate issues. Although a creative judge could undoubtedly reach the second issue if he really wanted to, Stuart's "implication was clear enough: If the circuit judges wished to protest about their treatment under the [Repeal Act], they would have to. bring a different lawsuit."so All of this raises an obvious question-why didn't the midnight judges follow Marbury or Stuart's lead and sue to recover their jobs? According to some scholars, they actually did. For instance, Bruce Ackerman points to a "little-known case" in which "one of the deposed circuit judges, Joseph Reed, did indeed bring an action ... to federal court" before dropping the lawsuit.' This certainly sounds promising, but for one fact: Joseph Reed was not a federal judge.
All that question that I now turn.
IV
Go back now to March 1802, just after the repeal of the Judiciary Act. The midnight judges, like most observers, had expected repeal for several months." Once it became a reality, William Tilghman, the chief judge of the Third Circuit, seized the initiative and wrote to the other judges on behalf of himself and his colleagues:
The act of the last session of Congress repealing the law under which we hold our offices has filled our mind with the most serious reflections. Thinking as we do, that the repealing law is a violation of the constitution, we feel ourselves impelled by sacred obligations, to take the legal measures for-disputing its validity. How to bring this important subject to a constitutional decision, with the least possible interruption of the public. conscience and tranquility; and how, in the meantime to conduct ourselves with the greatest propriety, are questions which require sure and mature deliberation. It appears to us that they cannot well be answered without a personal communication of sentiments between the The remaining midnight judges responded enthusiastically to Tilghman's letter. George Taylor hoped that together the judges might "prove the mistake of those who assert that written constitutions are feeble barriers when opposed to the rage of party or the passions of the people."
94 Egbert Benson agreed, informing Tilghman that he and his fellow judges for the Second Circuit "would readily conform themselves to whatever the Gentlemen who may assemble shall recommend." 9 5
Jeremiah Smith, Benjamin Bourne, Philip Key, and Charles Magill also could not attend, but they promised to support any plan that might emerge from Philadelphia. 96 At the same time, more sobering realities belied the judges' enthusiasm. Even if the judges had a legal right to their salaries, litigating the issue would be difficult and time-consuming. Several of the men had already begun looking for more stable employment. Jeremiah Smith moved quickly to accept a position as chief justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in May. 97 Charles Magill revealed that he had returned to private practice. 98 Oliver Wolcott, already in economic difficulties prior to his appointment to the bench, entered into serious discussions to oversee a copper mine in New Jersey as early as February 1802, before the Repeal Act had even passed the House. Before D'Oyley's fears could materialize, however, the judges had to figure out how to bring their case in the first place. Jurisdictional and common law vagaries combined to make direct judicial review of the midnight judges' claims quite difficult. Unlike William Marbury, the judges could not file for a writ of mandamus, a tool to force government officials to perform a nondiscretionary, ministerial act. Marbury sought the delivery of his commission, which he claimed had vested upon Adams' signature.'
02 By contrast, the midnight judges already had their commissions; indeed they had performed their duties throughout 1801. The issue, then, was not whether the judges' commissions to their offices had vested. It was whether the Repeal Act rendered the commissions null and void by abolishing the offices entirely, and here mandamus was no use. It would also be difficult for the judges to sue for their salaries directly. The background norm in the early Republic was that only the legislature could appropriate funds from the Treasury. ' Republican Congress would agree to pay them a regular salary after abolishing their courts, they would need another strategy.
Unfortunately, very few of the replies provided anything like specific proposals. Samuel Hitchcock remarked on the difficulty in "bring[ing] the subject before the proper tribunal."os Benjamin Bourne wrote to Tilghman in June expressing surprise that the judges were preparing for "active measures." 06 His circuit "supposed it would rest with the Judges of the Supreme Court to decide on the validity of the [R]epealing Act & that probably they would determine (informally) this question prior to the period fixed for the revived circuit courts."o' And, in the clearest sign of the judges' difficulties, William Griffith plaintively told Tilghman, "You must turn it in your mind-what we are to do at this meeting. As we have proposed it, no doubt the Gentlemen if they accede to the invitation will suspect from us some project: I have none, not even an Idea."' 08 Ironically, Oliver Wolcott, who had little formal legal experience before being elevated to the bench in 1801, wrote the most extensive reply by far. His letter contained a detailed memorandum laying out the constitutional case against the repeal. 0 9 Back in March, Wolcott had assured Representative Roger Griswold of his intent to, "in some form, record my opinion respecting the act for abolishing the Circuit Courts."" 0 However, Wolcott did not take immediate action because he recognized that the real initiative lay with the Supreme Court."' Now, the receipt of Tilghman's letter spurred Wolcott to develop a full indictment of the repeal. Where the other judges' replies had simply asserted the repeal's unconstitutionality without much argument, Wolcott undertook a sophisticated reading of constitutional text and structure. Although the legal basis against the repeal had been fleshed out during the Congressional debates, this was the first time a circuit judge had articulated the case so directly.
The Constitution, Wolcott wrote, "definitively stated" how officials Furthermore, the Constitution "authorized distinct provisions for securing a due compensation."l13 Wolcott declared it his "most decided conviction, that the Act . . . abolishing the Circuit courts, is repugnant to these principles" and would "reduce[] the Judiciary to a subordinate grade, dependent on the will of Congress and the President.""l 4
As he saw it, moreover, the Republicans' unrestrained conception of majority rule did not just put the federal judiciary at risk. The executive could easily become "a passive instrument of the ambition & passions of the Legislature," and the aristocratic Senate might similarly succumb to the more populist House."' Furthermore, the States might follow the federal lead and undermine judicial independence in their own governments. Wolcott foresaw corruption of the rule of law and civic decline throughout the Union."1 6 Concurrent attacks on the Federalistdominated judiciary in Maryland showed these fears of widespread partisanship were not totally unfounded." ' Wolcott reiterated what he had told Roger Griswold in March-that the initiative lay with the justices of the Supreme Court. But whatever the Court decided, he still felt the judges were obliged to speak out:
[T]he Circuit Judges, though oppressed by power & deprived of the means of exercising their functions, can declare and publish their opinions-of this recourse they cannot be divided, and in my judgment they are bound to exert it; that it may appear, that they are not responsible, for the consequence of a passive surrender of the public rights constitutionally committed to them." For Wolcott, moreover, this tactic was essentially majoritarian: "The Judges claim no exemption from responsibility to the People; to the will of the Nation, they are willing to submit. They merely claim, to be independent of the power or influence of the Legislative & Executive Departments in the expressions of judicial opinions."ll 9 The meaning of Wolcott's memorandum shifts, however, when one recalls that just a few weeks earlier, the Supreme Court decided it would indeed ride circuit again, effectively ousting the midnight judges.
12 0 This meant Wolcott's call for an independent judiciary to rise to the occasion and vindicate basic constitutional principles was stillborn, although he did not know it at the time. Indeed, it is curious that the Justices did not think to communicate their intentions to the midnight judges, especially since they had at least two clear opportunities. The judges only learned of the Court's stance through a remarkable encounter on the eve of the Philadelphia meeting. Judge Philip Key, one of the more controversial midnight nominees because he had fought for the Loyalists in the Revolutionary War, owed his successful confirmation in part to an influential backer: Samuel Chase.1 2 5 On his way to Philadelphia in July, Key paid Chase a visit. Considering the circumstances, the conversation must have been fascinating. Unfortunately, the written account is quite sparse, but, having escaped notice up to now, still deeply illuminating:
Mr. Chase informs us that the Judges of the Supreme Court have determined to go forward to the discharge of the duties imposed on them by the late Congress-that Congress was Competent to enlarge, diminish or annul our Judicial duties-and I understand (tho no opinion is given on the subject) that our Commissions and the right to our Salaries remain as before-this opinion formed by all the Judges renders inefficacious any attempt to support any exercise of Judicial Power vested in us by the Act under which we derive our Appointments.
6
Key's "understanding" from Chase that the midnight judges' commissions and salaries were unaffected by the repeal is worth noting, as none of the other justices raised the issue in their correspondence. Recall that only Justice Cushing responded to Chase's argument about ousting the midnight judges, and he merely stated that he did not think the Court had the "power" to restore the judges' offices or salaries.
12 7 Note also that, if Key could be believed, the legal challenge that would be advanced in Stuart v. Laird was dead on arrival. If the Court truly thought Congress was "competent to enlarge, diminish or annul" the judges' duties, it is hard to see why Congress could not transfer all pending cases from the 1801 Act courts into the old system. And while the judges might nonetheless retain a right to their salaries, Stuart did not directly raise that issue.
The judges could not easily bring the salary question to court, at least not directly. 128 However, Key proposed a scheme to get around this problem:
Perhaps being duly appointed and commissioned duties of a Judicial matter attach to us in principles of Co. Law, & so, the exercise of those duties, may be drawn into examination before the Supreme Court, and in that mode the Judges may declare that our Commissions remain as to all such duties, and of course our salaries.1 29 In other words, while Congress was competent to strip the circuit judges of all statutory duties, Key and the others might retain residual common law powers simply by virtue of their commissions. In testing this theory, the judges could permit the Court to pronounce on the repeal and, in the process, establish the judges' continuing right to their salaries.
It is admittedly difficult to understand exactly what Key had in mind here. The Judiciary Act of 1801 not only established the circuit courts, it defined their jurisdiction, empowered the judges to issue certain writs and empanel juries, appointed clerks and marshals, and specified where court records should be kept.1 30 All of these detailed specifications had now been repealed. Moreover, the Constitution was notably silent on the powers of federal judges, especially lower federal judges, whose very existence it left entirely in the hands of Congress.' 3 ' Hence, a signed commission by itself was a thin reed on which to base the exercise of judicial powers. Just as a practical matter, it would be difficult to test Key's theory that common law norms conferred freestanding authority on the holders of judicial commissions. Most probably, any attempt to perform a judicial act would simply be ignored. As one Republican congressman put it, "[I]f these men think they still hold their offices, . . . .
[1]et them take their seat upon the bench and see if the Marshal will obey them. Let them attempt to send a man to the whipping-post, or to jail, and I believe they will find out whether they are judges or not."l campaigned on widespread distrust of federal common law in connection with the hated Sedition Act.1 35 Some of the Republican hostility toward the Judiciary Act of 1801 involved suspicions about federal common law, as well.1 36 Moreover, although many Federalists were sympathetic to the idea of federal criminal common law jurisdiction, the judges' foremost ally on the Court, Justice Chase, had openly rejected it.' If the common law could not confer jurisdiction on federal judges in duly authorized courts, it seems yet a further step to say it can confer powers on a judge with no statutory authority whatsoever.
Whatever the particulars of Key's plan, it would surely have been enormously controversial. Unfortunately, none of the circuit judges expressed any recorded opinion about the idea, so it remains a tantalizing counterfactual. However, Key's July letter also included a second proposal. "If no other mode is devised of having a Judicial decision of our rights," he suggested, "would not a temperate dignified remonstrance to Congress, with a tender of our Services, and a demand of our salaries, be correct?"
138 This warranted skepticism, as it called for the judges to petition the very same legislature that had abolished their courts and salaries only a few months before. However, unlike the courts, Congress clearly had the power, if not the political will, to assign the judges new duties and to pay their salaries.
Key's letter probably deflated the Philadelphia meeting, which was not well attended anyway (Egbert Benson was the only judge outside of the Third Circuit to actually make the trip). Since the Supreme Court's decision to ride circuit threw whatever plan existed into disarray, the judges decided to hold another gathering. In August, Tilghman sent out notices to the circuit judges that had not made the July meeting:
We were convinced, by satisfactory information, that the Judges of the Supreme Court had determined to hold their Circuits under the Act of the last session of Congress. To that decision we are bound to submit. But it was our opinion, that altho precluded from holding Courts, yet our Commissions as Judges, & our right to receive the compensations fixed by law, remained in full force and in this sentiment we were confirmed, by the opinion of men of great Abilities, in various parts of the Union.' 9 Tilghman did not mention Key's common law plan at all. Instead, he endorsed the more moderate route, writing that "the prevailing Idea, at the meeting, seemed to be, that the subject would be most properly brought forward, by a memorial to Congress, at the next Session."l 4 0 Stressing the importance of unanimity once more, Tilghman requested that the judges attend a second gathering in November.
14 ' Just one day after Tilghman called for a second meeting in Philadelphia, the city's major Federalist newspaper, the Gazette of the United States, suspended its normal slate of articles and gave over nearly the entirety of its issue to an article entitled Judge Bassett's Protest. 42 The gist of the argument was familiar: the Constitution had vested distinct powers in three coequal departments of government and fixed the modes of selection and terms of office; judges plainly holding office under good behavior could not be removed unless convicted of misbehavior; the circuit judges were still in rightful possession of their commissions; the justices should refuse to obey the repealing laws; and Congress ought to make provisions by law for the continuance of the judges' courts and duties. Editors all over the country republished the story in their own papers, where it received a great deal of attention. any difference of opinion, between me and my associates in office, exists," it read, "it relates merely to the point of time for expressing our sentiments. I can confidently assert, that on deliberation, they coincide with me in other respects." 4 5 Indeed, the obvious source for much of the Protest was the judges themselves. In January, before the Repeal Act had officially been introduced, Judge William Griffith, Basset's colleague along with William Tilghman, had asked Tilghman to publish his opposition, "which tho' ineffectual at this time may years to come, carry to the bosoms of the unthinking . . . the conviction that a cheap government has made a cheap constitution."
46 Bassett might have seen Wolcott's letter at the July meeting, containing a memorandum on the repeal and an entreaty for the judges to publish their opinions should the Court duck the question. Bayard made a similar suggestion to Bassett in January, too.1
Unfortunately, as a persuasive essay, Bassett's Protest fell flat. Jefferson and his allies remained confident that they would carry the upcoming midterm elections.' 4 8 "Let [Basset and Bayard] not prove the strength of their party . .. by the points of their bayonets, but test them by the vote of the people!" declared one paper, "Let registers be opened . . . in every state, in which the citizens shall inscribe their votes on the important question." 4 9 Indeed, the Republicans won sweeping gains in the 1802 elections.
V.
The grim election results overshadowed the judges' upcoming November meeting, Which produced the finalized draft of the memorial to Congress. Now a private lawyer in Virginia, Charles Magill informed Tilghman that he would not attend. Jeremiah Smith, clinging to "a faint glimmering ray of hope, that the circuit judges will be restored," similarly declined.' Benjamin Bourne agreed to endorse the planned memorial, although he entertained "no hope of its meeting a favourable reception or and was primarily responsible for the document that emerged from the November meeting."' The final version struck a conciliatory tone while concisely expressing the judges' position. It adopted the same posture that the judges had imputed to the Supreme Court-namely, that although the law had stripped the judges of their powers, they remained vested in the office, which meant they could perform judicial duties and had a right to their salaries.1 5 6 The judges thus requested that Congress assign them new duties "consistent with the Constitution and the convenient administration of justice."' 57 As a practical matter, of course, this was highly unlikely, since earlier that year Congress had abolished the circuit courts, which it felt were unnecessary to the administration of justice. As for the judges' salaries, they offered to "cheerfully . 
Id.

branch not dominated by Republicans. The judges' effort, as they explained it, was the product of "a conviction that they ought not voluntarily to surrender rights and authorities intrusted [sic] to their protection, not for their personal advantage, but for the benefit of the community."s 9
During this time, Philip Key continued to press for more direct action. In December, he excitedly wrote to Tilghman for information about the November meeting. Key suggested that, if the judges could not agree on a plan, "after consulting a few Friends . .. if they approve of it I shall hold myself ready to do some Judicial Act, that shall bring in to view and before the Supreme Court, the Question whether my commission is vacated or not." 1 60 However, there is no indication that Key performed any "judicial act" in the coming months. Tilghman or Key's friends may have convinced Key otherwise (although there is no documentary evidence of this), or Key may simply have concluded that he could not achieve anything acting alone. All that is certain is that the tactic was not attempted, and Key did not mention it again.
Following the November meeting, the judges hastily circulated copies of the final draft among themselves. "The earlier in the Session the Business is brought before Congress the better," Benson urged. 161 He sent his own and Wolcott's copies to Tilghman and told Tilghman to direct the three signed memorials to their principal contacts in Congress-James Ross in the Senate and Roger Griswold in the House-with news that the more distant copies would follow.' 6 2 In mid-December, Tilghman forwarded the remaining signed copies to Roger Griswold. In a deeply pessimistic letter, Tilghman admitted that he "entertain[ed] no hope of present success" but that "it appeared to the Circuit Judges that it was incumbent on them to place on the record of both houses of Congress, their considerations & solemn Opinion, that the Act which annihilated the Exercise of their Judicial functions, without a suggestion of misbehaviour, was a violation of the Federal Constitution."l 6 3
It took almost two months for the memorials to be presented because James Ross, the judges' point man in the Senate, did not even arrive in 159. Id Washington until January 25. 164 On January 27, Ross and Griswold introduced the memorials in their respective chambers.' The House of Representatives took up the matter first. James Bayard, who had led the Federalist opposition to repeal in the House in 1802, was noticeably passive. He had been narrowly defeated in his re-election bid,1 66 and now not even his father-in-law's petition could rouse him. Writing to a friend, Republican Representative Ebenezer Elmer observed, "Mr. Bayard was entirely silent on the subject & refused to vote on every question that was taken.. . . As Bayard has determined to return to a private life, I suppose he does not wish to irritate any further the Republicans of Delaware." 67 With Bayard sidelined, Wolcott's friend Roger Griswold became the "principal agitator" for the Federalist cause in the House.'1 6 Immediately after Griswold introduced the memorial, the House debated whether to refer it to the Committee on Claims, which traditionally heard money claims against the United States, or to the Committee of the Whole, used when the entire body wished to debate a motion. They ultimately decided that, although it contained a demand for salary, it fundamentally turned on constitutional determinations about the Repeal Act that only the whole House was competent to resolve. To Griswold's great displeasure, the Republicans then moved to consider the memorials immediately rather than delaying a day or two to give the House time to consider the subject.1 6 9
Put on the spot, Griswold made two resolutions patterned on the judges' own requests: the first endorsing legislative action to provide new duties for the circuit judges and the second asking that their compensation claims be submitted to judicial decision.' 7 0 At this point, however, he seemed to rather inexplicably botch the job. Asked what duties he proposed to assign to the former judges, Griswold claimed that "he had not expected to have been called upon to define the plan that would be most agreeable to him," and lamely suggested that Congress might "restore the law which the Legislature had, at the last session, attempted to repeal."'' This was very strange. At some point in early 1803, Egbert No copy of the draft law survives, but it is clear that Griswold received the draft before he introduced the memorial to Congress, so why he did not use it is simply a mystery. 3 Unsurprisingly, the Republicans did not find the suggestion of restoring the Judiciary Act of 1801 convincing, and Griswold's first motion was predictably defeated.
Debate on the second motion-a law to provide for judicial resolution of the judges' salary claims-was more contentious. John Randolph thought it especially inappropriate to make an exception to the rule that the United States could not be sued in its own courts because the claim involved "the interests of judges, as a caste," so a judicial tribunal would inevitably be biased.' 74 But the crux of the problem was that, having just denied the judges' request for new duties, House Republicans could not understand why they should pay salaries to men with nothing to do. Both motions were thus rejected-according to one onlooker, "in a manner not very respectful""' 7 -after just a few hours of debate." ' The odds of success looked slightly better in the Senate, where the Federalists were able to send the memorial to a special committee, something their counterparts in the House had failed to do. What was more, because the Republicans inadvertently split their votes, the Federalists managed to secure all three committee memberships-James Ross, Gouverneur Morris, and Jonathan Dayton.' Historical Soc'y, Tilghman Family Papers).
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Benson's letter states that he had forwarded the proposal to Griswold along with a copy of the memorial signed by Judge Samuel Hitchcock. Since the House Journal shows that Griswold submitted Hitchcock's petition on January 27, Griswold must have had the draft law in his possession on that date as well. The impeachment trial, which convened in February 1805, was a major piece of political theater. John Marshall was asked to testify on Chase's behalf but, ever wary of further provocation, lent his associate only lukewarm support.
9 6 Yet when the Senate gave its verdict, the consensus was that Chase's defense team-which included, in an ironic touch, Philip Key-had far outclassed the opposition.19' The Republicans, previously so steadfast, now wavered. Significant numbers broke ranks on each count, while the Federalists voted unanimously to acquit.' Chase kept his job, and the threat to the judiciary receded.
Following the rejection of the memorial, the circuit judges dispersed to many of the state and national institutions they had thought so threatened by the repeal. William Tilghman became chief justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where he served for over two decades. His eulogist later remarked that Tilghman never spoke of his time as a circuit judge, finding it too painful to recount.' 99 Jeremiah Smith remained chief justice of New Hampshire until 1809, resigned to serve as governor, and later returned to the bench. His biographer called the loss of his office "the severest disappointment that Judge Smith experienced in his public life." 200 Bruce Ackerman, speculating about the misinterpreted Reed case, conjectures that the midnight judges chose not to go before the Supreme Court because "they were more interested in the future of the Federalist Supreme Court than in their private bank balances." 2 02 This is not entirely right. The judges cared a great deal about their private bank balances. From the very beginning, the pressure to earn income and replace their lost salaries hurt the judges' cause.
2 03 And because Congress refused to give the judges anything to do, their claims for their salaries-although analytically distinct from their claims to judicial duties-stood little chance of changing public or congressional opinion. As the Macon Telegraph put it in a retrospective on the midnight appointments written in 1888, "No very permanent interest could be taken in a question which resolved itself into whether sixteen very excellent gentlemen should continue or not to draw salaries from the United States treasury at the rate of $2,000 a year."204 At the same time, the judges were not naYve. They were well aware of the challenges they faced, and their efforts were as much about discharging a duty as actually reversing the repeal. "By presenting the Memorial we have acquitted ourselves to ourselves and to our Friends," Egbert Benson wrote as the matter moved toward Congress, "and the next thing, as far as Truth and Justice will permit, is to put our enemies in the array and expose them, and here I suspect our wishes, hopes and efforts will terminate." 205 In bits and pieces, the midnight judges offered up a constitutional argument that attempted to vindicate judicial independence even as it recognized the primacy of popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, their eventual failure was probably over determined-hostile public opinion, jurisdictional obstacles, political realignment, and a cautious Court all played a role.
In later years, the Repeal Act's precedential value was murky, giving rise to "a limping and stunted concept of branch independence" in the young Republic.
20 6 So too at the state level. In 1807, the Ohio legislature tried to impeach the state supreme court; when that failed, they reduced the length of the judges' terms of office. Initially, the judges refused to leave the bench, and an open crisis seemed likely before they backed down. 207 Years later, in 1824, Kentucky lawmakers abolished the state's highest court following a series of anti-debtor rulings and created a new one composed of their ideological allies. Unlike the midnight judges, the Kentucky judges chose to flout the legislature and continued to hear appeals. The resulting schism, with parallel courts taking cases, empanelling juries, and issuing indictments, was an endless source of confusion until 1826, when supporters of the old court were able to reinstate the original judges and end the crisis. 208 Still later, in Pennsylvania, the state attorney general filed a writ of quo warranto seeking a declaration that a state judge, whose district had been abolished and absorbed into another, had no right to exercise his office. 209 The court held that the legislature's repeal was invalid insofar as it deprived the judge of his guaranteed tenure, basically adopting the constitutional position advanced by the midnight judges sixty years earlier.
About six months after Congress rejected the judges' petition, John Marshall wrote to Oliver Wolcott, congratulating him on his move to New York City to begin a new career in business. Finally, the Chief Justice joked, Wolcott was "taking a station to be held really, not nominally, during good behavior." 2 11 Considering that the Supreme Court had done almost nothing to defend the vitality of this principle, Wolcott could be forgiven if Marshall's wisecrack fell flat. But he could also be satisfied that the midnight judges had, on the whole, conducted themselves well. As Wolcott put it in his initial draft of the memorial, "Having thus expressed their convictions, the undersigned leave the result to the wisdom of Congress; & if their decision shall be adverse to the right hereby claimed, to the experience of future times. 
